CI10-01-69727

## THE QUEEN'S BENCH WINNIPEG CENTRE

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) Mr. M. Finlayson
BETWEEN:
                               ) for the Plaintiff
GINA TAPPER AND
ALBERTUS HOLDINGS INC.,
                               ) Mr. T. Bock
                              ) for the Defendant
                 Applicant,
- and -
LAWRENCE TAPPER, RANCH HOLDINGS)
LTD., ALLOWAY INVESTMENTS LTD. )
AND OXBOW HOLDINGS LTD.,
                               ) Judgment delivered
                              ) September 8, 2011
                 Respondent.
OLIPHANT, J. (Orally)
                    before me an application by
          There is
respondent, Lawrence Tapper, and other related parties, for
an order pursuant to Rule 49.09 to order that a settlement
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fudgment or make an order accordingly.

The situation here is that two parties, both of
whom are shareholders -- I say two parties, I include the
corporate parties that each of them control. One party,
the respondent, Mr. Tapper, being a majority shareholder in
corporations and Gina Tapper, Ms. Tapper, being a minority
shareholder in that same corporation get into a dispute,
Ms. Tapper brings an application with respect to what she

agreement reached was, in fact, an agreement and to grant

alleges as is oppressive conduct on the part of the

- majority shareholder. Following the initiation of that application counsel have a discussion, the end result of that discussion is that Mr. Tapper agrees that he will buy the shares of Ms. Tapper in return for her giving up any right to pursue a claim that his conduct was oppressive in nature. Nothing further occurred in the course of that discussion, which I say was a discussion or series of discussions held without prejudice.
- 9 Subsequent to that initial discussion. 10 correspondence and e-mail messages that flowed between 11 counsel for the parties, Ms. Tapper decided not to pursue with any agreement or any proposal to have Mr. Tapper buy 12 13 Mr. Tapper then brings the motion before the her shares. court in which we are now involved. 14
- I have taken care to read the briefs of the parties and the law and I have had occasion to refer to the decision of my former colleague, Justice Nurgitz, in Aleph-Bet Child Life Enrichment Program Inc. -- and others -- v. Michael Kalo. That decision is cited at 2006 MBQB 107.
- In the course of rendering that decision, Justice
  Nurgitz, in his reasons for judgment, at paragraph nine
  refers to a decision out of the Ontario Superior Court, as
  it is now known, in <u>Cellular Rental Systems Inc. v. Bell</u>
  Mobility Cellular Inc. Justice Chapnik there says that the
  following have to exist where parties enter into settlement
  agreement and there is a dispute about the form of release.
- First of all, there has to be an agreement to settle a claim, an agreement to settle a claim -- first of all the point he makes is that:

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- 32 "1. an agreement to settle a claim
- is a contract;
- 34 2. to establish the existence of a

1	contract, the parties' expression
2	of agreement must demonstrate a
3	mutual intention to create a
4	legally binding relationship and
5	contain agreement on all of its
6	essential terms;
7	3. where the parties agree on all
8	the essential provisions to be
9	incorporated in a formal document
10	with the intention that their
11	agreement shall be binding they
12	will have fulfilled the requisites
13	for the formation of a contract.
14	The fact that a formal written
15	document needs to be prepared and
16	executed does not alter the
17	binding validity of the original
18	contract;"
19	
20	Number four and I think this is important.
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22	"4. where the essential provisions
23	intended to govern a contractual
24	relationship have not been settled
25	or agreed upon the original or
26	preliminary agreement does not
27	constitute an enforceable
28	contract;
29	5. in considering whether certain
30	terms of the settlement were
31	implied the court will look at the
32	settlement discussions and the
33	documentation and correspondence
34	in the context of normal business

1	practice and common sense;"
2	
3	And last.
4	
5	"6. no party is bound to execute a
6	document to effect the settlement
7	agreement which contains terms or
8	conditions which have not been
9	agreed upon and are not reasonably
10	implied in the circumstances."
11	
12	Having considered the evidence before the court
13	and the submissions that I have heard this morning, I am
14	not satisfied that there was an agreement as to the
15	essential terms of the contract or proposal covering the
16	sale and purchase of the shares held by Ms. Tapper, the
17	purchase of those shares by Mr. Tapper. I am not satisfied
18	that there is, by implication, or included in the
19	discussions, the essential terms of this contract.
20	First of all, while Mr. Tapper said he would buy
21	the shares it was not clear as to who the actual purchaser
22	would be, albeit his proposal was that it would be him or
23	some nominee but we do not know who the purchaser would be.
24	It seems to me that the parties to an agreement have to be
25	specified before you can have an agreement.
26	Secondly, there was no agreement as to the price
27	to be paid by Mr. Tapper for the shares held by Ms. Tapper.
28	In my view, there was no agreement as to the process that
29	would be followed for determining the value of the shares
30	and the price to be paid for those shares.
31	I am far from satisfied that this court has
32	jurisdiction to order the sale of shares which, in fact,
33	would occur when there is no finding of oppressive conduct.
34	That remains, in my mind, a serious question and I am not

1	satisfied that the court has the jurisdiction to do what
2	Mr. Tapper seeks it to do at this stage. But basically, in
3	my view, the motion to enforce the settlement agreement, as
4	alleged, has to fail because of the failure to demonstrate
5	that the essential provisions intended to govern the
6	contractual relationship have not been settled or agreed
7	upon and for that reason the motion by Mr. Tapper, Ranch
8	Holdings Ltd., Alloway Investments Ltd. and Oxbow Holdings
9	Ltd. is dismissed.
10	Counsel, do you want to address the question of
11	costs? There will be costs by the respondent to the
12	applicant.
13	
14	(SUBMISSION ON COSTS)
15	
16	THE COURT: The costs will be paid by the
17	applicant on this motion, who is the respondent on the
18	application on the basis of a class four action for a
19	contested motion in any event of the cause. They need not
20	be paid forthwith.
21	Anything further, counsel?
22	MR. BOCK: No, My Lord, thank you.
23	THE COURT: Thank you. Good morning.
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