File No. CI15-01-98227

E-File Name: 2018-10-23WVQGuilbertP

Appeal No.

IN THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR MANITOBA JUDICIAL CENTRE OF WINNIPEG

BETWEEN

PATRICK GUILBERT AND GUILBERT ENTERPRISES LTD.

Plaintiff

and

ECONOMICAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, TRADING AS THE ECONOMICAL INSURANCE GROUP

Defendant

TRIAL (Excerpt) (Pages T1 - T20)

October 23, 2018 Winnipeg, Manitoba

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1 Pr	oceedings ta	aken in the	Court of (Queen's E	Bench, W	Vinnipeg, 1	Manitoba
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2 3

October 23, 2018

Afternoon Session

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4

The Honourable Mr. Justice

The Court of Queen's Bench

7 D. Kroft for Manitoba

8

9 M. Davids

For the Plaintiffs

10 S. Fast

For the Plaintiffs For the Defendants

11 M. Finlayson 12 G. Lisi

For the Defendants

D. Delaronde 13

Court Clerk

14

15 16

Submissions by Mr. Finlayson (Voir dire)

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23 24

18 MR. FINLAYSON: So, My Lord, I need to deal with the

issue in two stages from Economical's perspective. On July 30th of 2015, RCMP polygrapher, Sergeant John Tost, T-O-S-T, told Shane Devlin in a telephone conversation that that day Mr. Guilbert had submitted to a polygraph examination in connection with the Neepawa Home Hardware fire of February 25 of '15, and that he had failed the test. Mr. Devlin, I believe, that -- that evening -- I think he was on holidays at the time, but that evening he communicated that information to Economical's counsel, myself, and to the more important people at Economical, with a warning that the information should be kept confidential.

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Now, the chronology is important, I think, overall, depending on what you decide obviously, but at that time there was no thought in the minds of anybody at Economical that it might later be asserted that Economical had acted in bad faith. The only issues on Economical's radar at that time were the issues of arson and fraud, breach of statutory conditions 6 and 7, and the breach of the duty of good faith by Mr. Guilbert. Those were the only duties. So when you're looking at -when you're conceptualizing that information and looking at it now and later, if you do look at it later, it's important to recognize that everybody knew at the time Mr. Devlin -- or everybody thought, I guess, at the time that that information was received that it would never see the light of day, that the result would be inadmissible because they didn't think bad faith was going to be a -- bad faith of Economical was going to be an issue. They never thought -- dreamt that they would be seeking the admission for any purpose of the result of the polygraph exam. They -- everybody knows that in arson and fraud, et cetera, it's not admissible. Like, so you got that. And, you know, Mr. Devlin may speak to -- to what weight, if any, what reliance, if any, one person might have given -- put on it, but everybody knew that in -- in the -- on the questions that we thought then were the issues in the case the polygraph was not in play.

And so remember the timing, so that's July 30th. And it was August 25th of 2015 that I wrote to Mr. Davids --

9 THE COURT: So that was July 30th of what year?

11 MR. FINLAYSON: '15.

13 THE COURT: '15, okay.

MR. FINLAYSON:
Yeah. And it was only, like, less than a month later that I wrote to Mr. Davids -- and this is in the -- it's in the materials. It's actually volume 2, tab 38. It's the letter in which, on behalf of Economical, I wrote to Mr. Davids and said the claim is denied based on arson and fraud and breach of statutory conditions 6 and 7.

So thereafter, as you will hear and as you see -- have seen already, it's in the materials before you, Economical's investigation continued. Further statements were taken. You'll -- you'll hear from Mr. LaBrash and Mr. Devlin, for example, that Economical did not get the OFC report, the report of Dick Harvey, until October 7th. So after they had already denied coverage they get this report from Harvey. It comes to me, and I say to Shane Devlin, you know, speak to him and him and him. And you'll see statements that are within a couple of weeks of that where the investigation continues. But at this time, again, still there's no idea that bad faith is in play.

Then, on October 23rd of '15, the statement of claim is issued. And, of course, the statement of defence and counterclaim were filed by Economical, and a defence to counterclaim was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. And then a motion is made by Economical for production of the RCMP file. And on -- well, by order of Master Berthaudin, on February 17 of 2016, that file was ordered to be produced to both parties. And within that file was this, among other things, this document which is the polygraph examination report. So in later February of 2016, Economical got a report which says, among other things: (as read)

The main issue under consideration was whether the subject was truthful in claiming he did not set fire to the

1 2	Neepawa Home Hardware store. It is my opinion		
3	· /		
4			
5	based on the polygraph examination, that in the above-		
6	mentioned subject that the above mentioned subject		
7	provided		
8			
9	And then there are three boxes, as I said, truthful, deceptive, and inconclusive, and		
10	he's checked deceptive: (as read)		
11			
12	in response to these three questions.		
13			
14	So he answered these three questions in the negative, and Sergeant Tost		
15	concluded, based on the exam, that the answers were deceptive. The first question		
16	was: (as read)		
17	was. (as icad)		
18	On Echmony 25th did you get that Hans Handman fine?		
	On February 25th did you set that Home Hardware fire?		
19			
20	The answer was no: (as read)		
21			
22	On February 25th was it you that set the Home Hardware		
23	fire?		
24			
25	,		
26			
27	On February 25th were you the person that set that Home		
28	Hardware fire?		
29			
30	And the answer was no. And then it goes on to discuss the circumstances, et		
31	cetera.		
32			
33	So later February of 2017 (sic), Economical has this report in its possession.		
34	to later 1 cording of 2017 (sto), 2000000000000000000000000000000000000		
35	THE COURT: '16 or '17?		
36	111E COCK1.		
37	MR. FINLAYSON: '16. '16.		
38	10. 10.		
	THE COURT.		
39	THE COURT: Yeah.		
40	MD FINI AVCON		
41	MR. FINLAYSON: February 17th of '16. Sorry.		

2 THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. FINLAYSON:

And within the RCMP file were many statements, which are in evidence -- all the statements that -- I believe that all the statements, apart from Mr. Guilbert's, himself, in the lengthy videotaped interview that occurred after the polygraph -- videotaped interview that occurred after the polygraph, all of the statements are in evidence, I believe. And it's important to remember that, you know, obviously, Economical takes the matter very seriously, was continuously re-assessing its positon, and would have looked at all those statements.

So, as I said, Economical, clearly, mistakenly, did not think, in the circumstances, that an allegation of bad faith would be pursued, but it has been, which means that any information that it possessed at the time of its denial, and thereafter, is relevant. And the result of the polygraph is not sought to be adduced to establish arson or fraud or bad faith by Patrick Guilbert, it is not sought to be adduced to show that Pat Guilbert is dishonest or was dishonest, it is sought to be adduced only because it has been asserted that not only was there no arson and no fraud and no bad faith by Patrick Guilbert, but that the process by which Economical made and maintained otherwise was dishonest or unreasonable. And to explain the process that Economical followed, and to prove that it has acted honestly and reasonable, it is not only entitled but actually -- My Lord, I go -- I go further, I say it's legally obligated, it's legally obligated to refer to the polygraph.

Now, just as Your Lordship said, if Economical had relied on a reading of tea leaves in coming -- in maintaining its denial, if somebody at Economical had claimed to have heard the voice of God or Allah Mackenzie King, his dead mom, you know, and said that that voice, God or my dead mom said deny that claim, you would be entitled -- we would -- you would be entitled -- Mr. Guilbert would be entitled to know that that was the case. There's no question about this. This is not a -- I'm sorry, I don't really -- consider a different case just to show the absurdity of not letting this evidence in for this purpose. Suppose that what happened was that Mr. Guilbert had passed the polygraph, and suppose that Economical, in the context of a bad faith allegation against it, concealed this and then it was discovered. What would the plaintiff be saying, do you think? If Mr. Guilbert had passed the polygraph -- John Tost phones up Shane Devlin on July 30th, 2015, and says, Shane, you're not going to believe this, he passed the poly, and then Mr. Devlin -- we kept it, we concealed it, and somehow it came out. What would the plaintiff be saying about whether it's relevant to the question of Economical's good faith or bad faith? There's no question. And I -- I can say this

with absolute certainty, and my friend will not contradict me, I guarantee this, My Lord, I guarantee that he will not say -- he will not say that if Mr. Guilbert had passed the polygraph it would not be alluded to, relied upon, or in some way adduced in this case. I guarantee it.

Now, Rule 53, which my friend relies upon, is what I think of as the expert rule of the Court of Queen's Bench. And I guess, you know, in fairness, it is true that, sort of, implicit in the polygraph result is an opinion, right. I mean, Sergeant Tost is a polygrapher, he's an expert, and he's, in effect, opining with a check mark an opinion which is, presumptively, of an expert nature to the effect that Pat Guilbert was deceptive in his answers. But Economical doesn't seek to rely on the opinion. We're not adducing the report or what we were told in connection with the opinion. We're not going to be relying on it to say he was deceptive. We're not going to be relying upon it to say that he committed arson. We're not going to be relying upon it to say he committed fraud. The only thing we're relying upon it for is to say we got this and you're entitled to know that this is one of the things that was in play as the case went forward, especially once the issue of bad faith was elevated to a real issue.

In the Béland case, the Supreme Court of Canada case, the point was there that the polygraph was being used to oath-help, like, it was to do with the credibility of a witness or a party. Well, that's not what we're doing. We're not adducing it to say anything about Mr. Guilbert's credibility. And the Supreme Court said that it was inappropriate -- by a majority, at least, said it was inappropriate because it, in effect, deals with character evidence and displaces the traditional role of a judge or a jury. So the plaintiff here confuses the case where we call -- adduce the polygraph to establish that the plaintiff is a liar, which we don't, with a case where we say only its information we got that is in the mix of -- that might have influenced somebody at some point in time to some degree, keeping in mind that when we got it we knew it wasn't going to be admissible so how much could we -how much weight could you -- have you put on it, right. Maybe it gave somebody in the mix comfort, like some kind of moral comfort, because who wants to deny a claim on this basis unless you believe it to be true. So somebody might have got some comfort from it, but everybody knew that it wasn't admissible, nobody relied on it on the material issues, and Mr. Devlin will -- will speak to that.

Now, in the area of insurance law -- and this is not an isolated area, of course, but in the area of insurance law, Canada and the United States have evolved in tandem. It's very traditional for Canadian courts to look to be influenced by and certainly consider American authorities in the context of insurance law. And in many ways we follow them in connection with punitive damages and breaches of

1 duty of good faith. We -- we're a bit behind them in some ways. Maybe that's 2 good. But we -- we -- we are influenced by them, and it is totally appropriate for 3 Canadian courts to be -- at least consider what American courts have done. And 4 that's why we filed the authority we did, which is --5 6 THE COURT: From Ohio. 7 8 MR. FINLAYSON: From Ohio, where it says exactly what 9 we're saying here is appropriate. And it's at, what is tab --10 11 THE COURT: Fifteen. 12 13 MR. FINLAYSON: Yes, exactly. And it's at page -- page 4 of 8. And it's really that whole page that deals just with this issue. And I'll just go to 14 15 the second last paragraph since Your Lordship, clearly, has read it, but it says: 16 17 The better rule of law, and the one adopted here, is that 18 where an insured claims bad faith and the lack of a basis for rejecting coverage by an insurer, the results of a 19 20 polygraph ... (exam by) the insured, taken with his 21 consent, are admissible with the proper cautionary 22 instruction as proof of a basis to reject coverage. 23 24 That seems reasonable. Like, really what's -- what's at stake, in essence, in a bad 25 faith assertion is, in some sense, state of mind. And how -- how can Economical 26 say -- like, I wouldn't -- I can tell you, I wouldn't be here making this argument if he passed the polygraph, so how can it not be pertinent to say Economical got this, 27 you should know. 28 29 30 That's my -- those are my comments. Thank you. 31 32 THE COURT: I have a question for you --33 34 MR. FINLAYSON: Yes. Yes. 35 36 THE COURT: -- before I hear -- because it may have to 37 do with the response. If -- if, for the record -- and I think you've -- you've answered it in your submissions -- if, for the record, and assuming for the minute I 38 39 were inclined to allow it, what -- give me the words of the limitations that we

would put on it.

40 41

1 MR. FINLAYSON: This is what I proposed to Mr. Guilbert 2 on Friday, and I think it's still helpful. Pardon me, to Mr. Davids. It's really just the 3 second paragraph that you're concerned with now. 4 5 THE COURT: So really that last sentence --6 7 MR. FINLAYSON: Exactly. 8 9 THE COURT: -- there. 10 11 MR. FINLAYSON: Yes. 12 13 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 14 15 Mr. Davids? 16 17 Submissions by Mr. Davids (Voir dire) 18 19 MR. DAVIDS: My Lord, R. v. Béland, decided 30 years 20 ago, a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, provides that polygraph evidence is inadmissible in courts in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada set out several 21 contexts in which the inadmissibility is found, including the general rule against 22 23 oath-helping, including the rule against past consistent statements. In other words, you can't adduce evidence that says, oh, this statement is consistent with 24 something said in the past by the -- the witness. 25 26 27 THE COURT: M-hm. 28 29 MR. DAVIDS: Rule relating to character evidence. You can't, sort of, bolster character with statements that aren't simply statements of 30 31 fact. And, last but not least, expert evidence. 32 33 The purpose for which my learned friend seeks to use the polygraph evidence in 34 this case is to submit the results in evidence. It doesn't have anything to do with 35 the mere taking of the polygraph test in a situation where passing or failing is not at hand. It has to do with submitting the result. The result was a fail, therefore 36 37 Economical acted in good faith. That's what is happening here. The Court would be on very spongy ground to say, well, I think we can let the polygraph in if it's 38 under certain very strict strictures. I suppose strict strictures is a bit redundant, but 39 the idea being that my learned friend's statement, which is certainly cogent, 40 certainly sets out what he is attempting to do, which is to say, well, it's not going 41

to the plaintiff's actual -- an actual finding against the plaintiff, it's going only to the good faith of the defendant. But as my learned friend says, on one hand -- he said two things in his submission. He said, well, if the polygraph were positive you can be sure that the plaintiff would be saying what -- the polygraph was positive, that's bad faith that we're still here. And then Mr. Finlayson goes on to say if the polygraph was positive we wouldn't be here. Precisely, that's the whole point, is that it has nothing to do with the examples in the cases set out in Mr. Finlayson's book of authorities.

And I'll go to the Canadian cases, where he cites Whiten, and then one involving this defendant, Economical Mutual Insurance Company. In each case, the issue is an offer to -- an offer of a polygraph exam. Daphne Whiten offered to take a polygraph, and the Court found, well, the jury must have considered that in its deliberations as evidence of her good faith. But the point is there was no result there. It was simply an offer and that's it. There was never a result put to the Court. The same goes for the Economical Mutual Insurance Company case and the numbered company in Ontario, but flipped it around. The insurance company said will you take a polygraph, and the insured refused. And the Court of Appeal said, well, that's relevant. We're not talking about results. We're talking about the making of the offer to have the test and that's it, period. As soon as you have a result you're in a completely different realm. The fact of the result cannot be avoided. There is a result. So because there is a result, that is what is being admitted into evidence. And the Supreme Court of Canada, in Béland, clearly says you can't submit the result into evidence. It's clear.

So from that point of view, I -- I look for cases. Where -- where is this --

Well, to be -- to be fair, you haven't submitted -- neither side, when I say you -- but it -- it talks about solely for the purpose of bolstering. In other words, I -- I don't think it forecloses -- I don't read it as absolute as you do. I mean, if -- it clearly says that you can't use it to oath -- what's the word they use?

34 MR. FINLAYSON: Oath-helping.

36 MR. DAVIDS: Oath -- oath-helping.

38 THE COURT: Oath -- oath-helping --

40 MR. DAVIDS: Yeah.

1	THE COURT:	or to substitute the tester's discretion
2	for my own. I mean, that that, to me	, was is crystal clear. Anyway, I'm just
3	saying I don't know if if I	
4		
5	MR. DAVIDS:	Well, but
6		- 27 liga - 11 Diagrams
7	THE COURT:	I
8		
9	MR. DAVIDS:	but in the the specific context
10		Well, the man you've the to
11	THE COURT:	What about the American case, which
12	seems to be on all fours with this one?	may mean or thousands.
13		
14	MR. DAVIDS:	Well, I the American case, read it
15	once. I don't have any comments about	the American case, other than to say that
16		lts of a polygraph examination taken with
17		oper cautionary instruction. That's not the
18	law in Canada.	
19		
20	THE COURT:	So that that's your answer. You're
21	saying even if it is on point, I I'm not -	<u> </u>
22		
23	MR. DAVIDS:	Well
24		
25	THE COURT:	not only I'm not bound to it, you're
26	saying that's not the law in Canada?	er to the property
27		
28	MR. DAVIDS:	That's correct. The the the Court in
29	Ohio makes its decision based on the law	was it sees it for the citizens of the State of
30		clearly better authority. And and that's
31	-	preme Court of Canada has to be followed.
32	The the Court would be, again	
33	, 0	
34	THE COURT:	But the facts in in in the Supreme
35	Court case are are also very different t	
36		
37	MR. DAVIDS:	But the principle is is the same. The
38		at the expert evidence and and the reason
39	why you bring in expert evidence, and the	-
40	, ,,,,,,	and the state of t
41	THE COURT:	Can you let me ask you and, again.

1		I've read the cases, we've had some pre-	
2		argument that if if I'm here to do to	
3	decide fairly, both in respect of your client and the other side, that if if your		
4	client has alleged bad faith in the context of punitive damages, in other words to		
5	as a as a pre-condition to getting punitive damages, that I'm foreclosed from		
6	looking at all the evidence of the conduc	et of the of the insurer?	
7			
8	MR. DAVIDS:	I don't think we're saying that.	
9	THE COURT		
10	THE COURT:	Well, that's what you're that's what	
11		k at what as part of that they received	
12	something and acted on it, just that fact,	that that I'm that that there's a	
13 14	MR. DAVIDS:	V	
15	MR. DAVIDS:	Your	
16	THE COURT:	and and what I'm toning to waith	
17		and and what I'm trying to weigh	
18	0		
19		the overall pie, but I really can't make that	
20	determination based on the evidence I have	-	
21	determination based on the evidence i ha	ave 30 fat.	
22	MR. DAVIDS:	But but that's that's precisely the	
23		doesn't need the result of the polygraph.	
24		R. v. Abbey, it's at page 13 of 25 of the	
25		en you accept an expert, what you, as the	
26	Court, are doing is saying there are certa		
27	, 5 , 5	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
28	THE COURT:	M-hm.	
29			
30	MR. DAVIDS:	II can't figure out exactly what the	
31	science behind this phenomenon is tha	t the expert led evidence on. It helps the	
32	Court	White the same of property of	
33			
34	THE COURT:	Help me understand something. What	
35	decision is it making for me in the conte	xt of the bad faith?	
36			
37	MR. DAVIDS:	Well	
38			
39	THE COURT:	What what what what	
40	decision		
41			

1	MR. DAVIDS:	Yeah.
2 3 4 5 6 7		does the fact of the polygraph m not talking about arson, I'm not talking in terms of the the the reason for the
8	MR. DAVIDS:	Yeah. Yeah.
9		
10 11 12 13 14	THE COURT: defendant, what decision does does polygraph test determine for me, as opp to determine?	but in terms of the conduct of the does the consideration of the receipt of a osed to what it takes away from my ability
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	you've heard so far and the evidence that don't have the polygraph, that's what you don't have the polygraph, you're in polygraph. The Court is saying you've	Well, I I think the the the key is ions are going to be based on the evidence it my learned friend is going to lead. If you the Supreme Court of Canada is saying if no different a position than if you had the e got plenty of other stuff with counsel amination on that evidence, you've got all ad faith.
24 25 26 27	THE COURT: yesterday and you're not saying anythin with the fact of the polygraph?	But but you're not and you've said g different today you're not taking issue
28 29 30 31	MR. DAVIDS: admission of the result. The the admiting bit or whether it's a fair bit or a lot,	No. We're taking issue with the itting of the result is whether it's only a whatever it is
32 33 34	THE COURT: they acted the way they did? From their	What if that was a material piece in why from
35 36	MR. DAVIDS:	But but if it if
37 38	THE COURT:	from their perspective
39 40	MR. DAVIDS:	but, My Lord, if if if if
41	THE COURT:	Because there's nothing wrong with them

1 2	say there was assume for a minute otherwise there's nothing wrong in te	and I'm assuming, nobody has suggested
3	and the should be wrong in to	this of their receipt of the information.
4 5	MR. DAVIDS:	Correct.
6	THE COURT:	So and let me take an extreme
7		y not argue this, but what if you say there
8	was absolutely no basis for them to	do the next step and they're they're
9	foreclosed they're (INDISCERNIE	LE) per se, well, there was a basis, we had
10		us being the polygraph that caused us
11		ou're saying I can make the argument of bad
12	faith, but they can't explain why they to	ook the step. That's this is what I'm, kind
13	of, struggling with in my head. Totally	separate, and I'm I'm not speaking
14		
15	MR. DAVIDS:	Yeah.
16		
17	THE COURT:	at all to my conclusions about
18	deliberate setting of the fire	
19	MD DAVIDS	a see seen med in public and
20	MR. DAVIDS:	And and
21	THE COUNT.	
22	THE COURT:	opportunity, nothing to do with that
23	piece of the case.	
24 25	MR. DAVIDS:	And and and hands when here
26	they got a result. That's why, because the	And and and here's why, because
27	they got a result. That's why, because th	ley got a fesuit.
28	THE COURT:	Okay. Maybe let's I don't want to
29		for for Mr. Finlayson. We talked about it
30		ngs around. How I'll make a decision on
31		leave for today. Does anything more than
32		Ar. Davids objects to this but if if the
33		pt we received a polygraph and because of
34		an, do do we need the punchline? I mean,
35	it might be it might be obvious, but de	
36	W. Colors	
37	Submissions by Mr. Finlayson (Voir dire	
38		
39	MR. FINLAYSON:	You know, My Lord
10		
11	THE COURT:	I don't know if that changes things, but, I

```
1
        mean, if that --
 2
 3
    MR. FINLAYSON:
                                                I -- well, I think it does, and I think the --
        the -- the American case suggests it does. And -- and, you know, this wouldn't be
 4
 5
        an issue if bad faith weren't asserted, right.
 6
 7
    THE COURT:
                                                Yes.
 8
 9
    MR. FINLAYSON:
                                                You know, the one way to do away with
        it is for the plaintiff to abandon the assertion of bad faith. That could have been
10
11
        done at any time once --
12
13 THE COURT:
                                                Yeah.
14
15
    MR. FINLAYSON:
                                                -- they knew this was in -- in the mix. I
        don't see -- if you say they got the polygraph and they continued on, it's certainly
16
17
        an ambiguous message, right, because -- I guess if it was understood that -- yeah,
       you see, I -- I can't speak to whether it influenced and how much it influenced any
18
19
       of the deciders later on, especially when, you know, other stuff happened. I just
20
        think it's right to admit it, that's what it comes down to.
21
22
    THE COURT:
                                                Okay.
23
24
    MR. FINLAYSON:
                                                But -- but if Your Lordship thought --
       well, yeah, I just don't see -- I think the example I gave is -- is fair, that -- that if --
25
       if Mr. Devlin's dead grandma had said, you know, we have to deny this claim --
26
27
28
    THE COURT:
                                                M-hm.
29
30
    MR. FINLAYSON:
                                                -- that would be admissible even though
       it's crazy, right. It's admissible because -- and the plaintiff would want and should
31
32
       want to know that --
33
34
    THE COURT:
                                                Yeah.
35
36
    MR. FINLAYSON:
                                                -- because it influences the decision
       making and the reasonableness of the decision making. How do you -- how can
37
       you say -- how can you deny us, Economical, the right to say, you know, we acted
38
       -- if we lose on the arson, if we lose on everything else, we still acted reasonably,
39
       and one of the reasons we say that is, look, he failed a polygraph.
40
41
```

1 2 3 4	THE COURT: of the polygraph isn't there I mean, n may say they acted on a	And you're saying if the if the failure ot if someone were to do mischief, they
5	MR. FINLAYSON:	A whim or
7 8	THE COURT:	on a whim or something
9 10	MR. FINLAYSON:	Yeah. Yeah.
11 12	THE COURT:	even though we have
13 14	MR. FINLAYSON:	Yeah.
15 16	THE COURT:	the fact of the polygraph there.
17 18 19 20 21	MR. FINLAYSON: something my friend said before I is polygraph so Economical was acting in not saying that that's full answer or anythere.	Yeah, it's I do need to correct forget. He said Mr. Guilbert failed the good faith. We don't say that, right. We're hing or that
22 23	THE COURT:	I've never assumed that that's the case.
242526	MR. FINLAYSON: that that	Okay. Okay. Yeah. But but he did say
27 28	THE COURT:	Yeah.
29 30 31	MR. FINLAYSON: okay. I'm sorry.	was my argument, and it isn't, so,
32 33 34	THE COURT: Finlayson. Did you have anything	Sorry, I I kind of went to Mr.
35 36	MR. DAVIDS:	Well
37 38 39	THE COURT: wanted to ask my question.	we're a little out of order, but I had to
40 41	Submissions by Mr. Davids (Voir dire)	

1 MR. DAVIDS: Well, yes. Mr. Finlayson, in effect, said I -- I don't know the degree to which it influenced his client, and that's precisely the 2 point, is that it doesn't really matter the degree to which it influenced his client 3 because that's not an area you're going to explore unless you are talking about the 4 result itself being relevant. It's the result. That's what he's saying, he wants the 5 6 result in. 7 8 THE COURT: He -- he is saying that. I'm -- I'm not --9 10 MR. DAVIDS: Yeah. 11 12 THE COURT: -- I'm not -- I was asking him what if you 13 kept -- but I think, in fairness --14 15 MR. DAVIDS: Yeah. 16 17 THE COURT: -- and he'll acknowledge, that at the end 18 of day --19 20 MR. DAVIDS: That --21 22 THE COURT: -- but he -- but it -- it's in the context of the damages and the -- and the bad faith, and -- and he -- and he says -- and how 23 do you address -- I don't want to involve -- I'll use my deceased grandmother, but 24 -- but, like, if -- if -- taking that analogous -- analogy, without, in any way, 25 diminishing the seriousness of -- of what we're talking about, I mean, is -- is this 26 anything other than a piece of information that, like it not, existed at the time that 27 caused them to go -- go further, and can it not be admitted -- and remember this 28 isn't going to a jury or anything, this is me. It's not like I have to give an 29 instruction on this piece. I -- I -- I understand -- and I'm not saying it's a different 30 approach, but contextually this is a judge alone trial. I'm not giving the fact finding 31 to the jury here. I -- it's -- it's me. But if I -- if we stipulate that it is -- it's irrelevant 32 -- it's relevant really only to the allegation of bad faith. To me, in one hand -- and 33 I'm sympathetic to what you're saying. It's, kind of -- you're raising an argument 34 and saying but you can't use all your -- your bullets to fight back. And you don't 35 object to the bullet being shot, you're just saying that we can't talk about the bullet. 36 And -- and maybe that's a bad analogy too, but -- but in one sense that's what it 37 keeps coming down to me. You're raising an issue, as you're entitled to do, and --38 and, at the end of the day, may be right, but to raise it and then say but you can't 39 do anything to -- to -- or not you can't do anything, you can't put all your -- you 40 can't use all your ammo --41

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2	MR. DAVIDS:	And and
4 5	THE COURT:	to me also has to be factored into this.
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	your arsenal, if it's a hundred, what you do is you you you put something and stuff substitutes for this bullet. So	Well but to use that analogy, it's as the ind however many bullets you have in do is and this is one, what, in effect, you around that bullet and say and this casing you've got 99 others, and then you put ct, replace that bullet. That's what that's
14 15 16 17	THE COURT: conditions that it cannot, in any way, be your	Yeah, and the replacement would be used to, basically, allege bad faith against
18 19	MR. DAVIDS:	No, I don't think that's what
20 21	THE COURT:	client.
22 23	MR. DAVIDS:	the Supreme Court is is saying.
2425	THE COURT:	Okay.
26 27	MR. DAVIDS:	I I
28 29 30	THE COURT: decision.	Well, maybe then I just have to make the
31 32	MR. DAVIDS:	I I think the Supreme Court
33 34	THE COURT:	I hear what you're saying.
35 36 37 38 39	MR. DAVIDS: question of safeguards, it's a question sense, redundant. You already have that hundredth. Well, you actually do have th	the Supreme Court is saying it's not a more of you don't need something, in a bullet. You say you have 99 and here's the e hundredth somewhere else.
40 41	THE COURT: it?	Where is it and what use can be made of

1		
2	MR. DAVIDS:	It's all of the all of the evidence that
3	goes to	and of the evidence that
4		
5 6	THE COURT:	So I have 99, not 100?
7	MR. DAVIDS:	
8		Well, I think the Supreme Court of
9	Canada is saying you don't no	eed the hundredth.
10	THE COURT:	de politikandere et
11		Okay. So I think we're down to an
12	half on hour I at ma just and	both have given me. I propose that we break for a
13	nan-an-nour. Let me just gath	ner my my thoughts, and I'll make a ruling.
14	MR. DAVIDS:	= 10=7108, The pot 1 , 1 , 1
15	MR. DAVIDS:	Thank you, My Lord.
16	THE COURT OF ERV.	- U AUMILI Me 2012
17	THE COURT CLERK:	Order, please rise.
18	THE COURT:	" To be detailed probagos
19	THE COURT:	Thanks.
20	TUE COLIDT OF EDV.	
21	THE COURT CLERK:	Court will take a recess.
22	(ADIOLIDAIMENT)	
23	(ADJOURNMENT)	
24	THE COURT CLERK:	
25	THE COURT CLERK:	All right, we're back on the record.
26	Duling (Voir dine)	
27	Ruling (Voir dire)	
28	THE COURT:	New I propose
29		Thank you for your submissions. These
30	are my reasons on the voir di	ire respecting the polygraph test. Should a transcript
31	be ordered, I reserve the right	nt to revise or elaborate on the reasons in a manner
32	consistent with my conclusion	S. The control of the second s
	As Ma Devil 111	timb - Ekpling to the set of permanent
33 34	As Mr. Davids did not take	issue with Mr. Finlayson's explanation of how and
	when the polygraph came to	be in the possession of Economical, I will simply
35	incorporate Mr. Finlayson's ex	explanation into these reasons by reference, and it will
36	certainly be reflected on the tr	anscript.
37	M 0 31	the second particles of the second particles and the second particles are second particles and the second particles are second particles and the second particles are second part
38	IVIT. Guilbert does not assert	requesting the polygraph amounted to bad faith. In
39	support of his position, Mr. G	uilbert relies on the 1987 Supreme Court of Canada
40	criminal case of R. v. Bélana	I. In R. v. Béland, two accused were seeking to re-
41	open their defence so that the	ey could each take a polygraph and then tender the

results in court. The conclusions of the court are adequately summarized in the headnote of the CanLII version of the decision, and I'll just read that:

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The results of a polygraph examination are not admissible as evidence. The polygraph has no place in the judicial process where it is employed as a tool to determine or to test the credibility of witnesses. The admission of such evidence would offend well established rules of evidence, in particular, the rule against oath-helping, which prohibits a party from presenting evidence solely for the purpose of bolstering a witness' credibility, the rule against the admission of past or out-of-court statements by a witness and the character evidence rule. The polygraph evidence is also inadmissible as expert evidence. The issue of credibility is an issue well within the experience of judges and juries and one in which no expert evidence is required. Further, the admission of polygraph evidence will serve no purpose which is not already served. Such admission will disrupt proceedings, will open the trial process to the time-consuming and confusing consideration of collateral issues and will deflect the focus of the proceedings from the fundamental issue of guilt or innocence.

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And I will stop there.

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I respectfully disagree that the proposed purpose for the evidence is as described by Mr. Guilbert. More particularly, it is Mr. Guilbert who, in support of his punitive damages claim, alleges the defendant conducted itself in bad faith. It is in this context, i.e. as a shield, that Economical seeks to refer to the polygraph. It is not to undermine credibility or any other evidentiary rule, but instead, to establish Economical did not act in bad faith, as alleged by Mr. Guilbert. It goes to course of conduct, nothing else.

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I believe it is appropriate to admit the evidence. It is probative -- it's probative value outweighs any possible risk of confusion. And bear in mind, that at the end of the day, when I assess the evidence as a whole, the polygraph may prove to be of little or of no weight, or somewhere in between. It will go to course of conduct, as I said, and that is it. I further order that it won't be referred to or relied on or used in any way in the context, argument, or the determination of the issues or arson, fraud, breach of statutory conditions, and/or breach of duty of good faith, as

pled by Economical.

I find support for my decision in the Ontario Superior Court decision of Fisher's Fine Cleaners (phonetic), which, in turn, relied on the 1999 Ontario Court of Appeal decision in the Whiten v. Pilot litigation. As I do in this case, the Court in Fisher's Fine Cleaners distinguished the R. v. Béland decision. My views also find support in the Ohio 1985 decision of Moss v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance. And to that end, I'll read in two paragraphs appearing on page 4 out of 8:

This case does not involve the question of whether and under what circumstances the results of a polygraph test are admissible as bearing on the issue whether Robert Moss committed the arson. Rather, the question presented is whether such evidence is admissible on the issue of whether defendant had a valid basis for rejecting plaintiffs' claim and, if the evidence is so admissible, whether its probative value is outweighed by the possibility of confusion of the issues.

Skipping down one paragraph:

The better rule of law, and the one adopted herein, is that where an insured claims bad faith and the lack of a basis for rejecting coverage by an insurer, the results of a polygraph examination of the insured, taken with his consent, are admissible with the proper cautionary instruction as proof of a basis to reject coverage.

It is for these reasons I'm prepared to admit the fact and result of the polygraph, subject to the conditions that I have previously noted a few moments ago.

34 EXCERPT CONCLUDED

IN THE MATTER OF PATRICK GUILBERT AND GUILBERT ENTERPRISES LTD. V. ECONOMICAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, TRADING AS THE ECONOMICAL INSURANCE GROUP

I, KARI SHORT, Court Transcriber, HEREBY MAKE OATH AND SAY that the foregoing typewritten pages being numbered T One (T1) to T Nineteen (T19), inclusive, contain a true and correct transcription of the recorded proceedings taken herein to the best of my knowledge, skill and ability.

COURT TRANSCRIBER